Abstract
INTRODUCTION
In main function, the banks collect funds from surplus units and invest to deficit units in the form of loans and other financial instruments. Casu, et.al (2006) defined the bank is an intermediary institution that bridges the gap between lender and borrower to perform the functions of transformation, namely transformation size, maturity transformation and risk transformation. As a financial intermediary, the banking industry may be the highest vulnerable to financial risk. The functions are causes of vulnerability as a result of the bank's activities. This condition causes the banks face the risk of maturity mismatch are vulnerable to the threat of a bank run, namely withdrawals massive panic caused by customer. Besides the risk of maturity mismatch, other lines of bank business also cause the vulnerability of banks.
The main income of banks is difference between interest loans to creditors with interest given by banks to customers. But the bank also has other sources of income in the form of profit foreign exchange trading and securities. From this source of income, there is a gap that can lead to bank failures, when a decline in asset values as well as the increased uncertainty in the financial sector that have a negative effect on the activity of bank's operations. A systemic financial crisis will have an impact if many banks that have failed. The failure of one bank can propagate such as infectious diseases, causing more bank failures. If a bank failure or crisis cannot be dealt with swiftly, then there will be contagion effects that would trigger a systemic crisis in the economic system. Systemic risk is defined as the potential instability due to interference transmitted in some or all of the financial system due to the interaction of size, business complexity and interconnectedness between institutions and/or financial markets as well as the tendency of excessive behavior from the behavior/financial institutions to follow the economic cycle (Bank of Indonesia, 2014) . Systemic risk could be a polemic in Indonesia when the Financial System Stability Committee poured huge funds to rescue Bank Century (renamed Bank of Mutiara and later became J-Trust Bank). The recent financial crisis revealed that micro-prudential regulatory framework is not enough to prevent contagion across the world as a result of bank failures that began in the United States and later in Europe and other parts of the world, including in Indonesia. Signifikan Vol. 6 (2), October 2017 Micro-prudential regulatory framework is based on the provisions of Basel I and II agreements, which impose minimum capital requirement (Capital Adequacy Ratio/CAR) as a preventive measure against unexpected losses (Pillar I). Drakos and Kouretas (2014) revealed that the Basel II agreements led to the development of internal systems for measuring market risk and regulation as viewed soundness of individual financial institutions. However, these provisions only based on capital adequacy ignore factors such as size, level of leverage, and the relationship with the entire system. Arnold et.al. (2012) found the key aspects of the new regulatory reforms through the Basel III agreement, including measurement and regulate systemic risk, as well as designing and implementing macro-prudential policies in a proper way.
Basel III agreement is still in formation is expected to address most of the problems associated with systemic risk and developing an appropriate framework for regulation and supervision of financial markets. For central banks and financial regulators, this is a great value to be able to measure the risks that could threaten the financial system, not only at national level but also globally. Given the magnitude of losses incurred as a result of a systemic crisis, this study measures the level of systemic risk in the financial system in Indonesia, with a focus on banking institutions.
Assessing the level of systemic risk has gotten a lot of attention after the US financial crisis in [2007] [2008] . The main points of the issue of systemic risk is that the bank is experiencing distress will create panic in the financial system during periods of distress, causing the failure of other institutions and lead to the financial crisis. The most common measurement tool used by financial institutions in measuring the risk is value-at-risk (VaR), which was introduced by Jorion (2006) . VaR is used to calculate possible losses of financial institutions within a certain confidence level. The problem that arises is that VaR does not consider the institution as part of a system that may be able to experience instability and spreading economic risks. Furthermore, it is known that the assessment focuses on information bank balance sheets, including the ratio of non-performing loan (NPL), earnings and profitability, liquidity and size of capital adequacy is not appropriate to evaluate the health of the financial system (Huang, et.al, 2009; Benoit, et.al, 2013) .
Systemic risk contained in any system that is built by the components interacts with each other. A systemic risk said to be due to such risks arising from the (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) . The systemic risk is the risk of joint failure arising from the relationship between return on assets from the bank's balance sheet (Acharya, et.al, 2010 ), Second, the current disruption of credit can make a reduction in the provision of funds.
This activity is to finance profitable investment opportunities in the non-financial sector. Third, the collapse of asset prices, may be caused by a drastic reduction in the money supply aggregates caused by a bank run or a general decline in the liquidity of financial markets, could lead to financial failure as well as companies non-financial, and reduce economic activity through a reduction in wealth and increased uncertainty.
There are two an important element of the definition of systemic risk presented by De-Bandt and Hartmann (2000), which shocks and propagation mechanisms. A shock can be idiosyncratic or systematic. In the context of the extreme is idiosyncratic shocks initially only affects the health of a single financial institution or just a single asset prices, be systematic in the extreme that affect the entire economy, affecting all financial institutions at the same time. Shocks systematic national financial system can be fluctuations in general business cycle or a sudden increase in inflation.
Crash capital markets that act as shock systematic in the majority of financial institutions normally have no effect uniformly. The same applies also to the lack of liquidity in financial markets, which may be associated with a crash or some other event that causes doubts on the financial health of ordinary traded in the financial markets (De-Bandt and Hartmann, 2000) .
The second key element in a systemic event in the narrow sense is a mechanism that shocks propagate from one financial institution to another financial institution. This is the essence of the concept of systemic risk. The spread of shocks in the financial system that work through physical exposure or effect information (including the potential loss of trust) cannot be considered simple. From the conceptual point of view, the transmission of shocks is a natural part of the adjustment to stabilize the market system to establish a new equilibrium. Regarding the type of systemic activity caused simultaneously by surprise systematic mechanisms that lead to default or crashes may often involve the propagation of macroeconomic includes interactions between real and financial variables. For example, a cyclical downturn may trigger a wave of corporate failures, not only increases the non-performing loans in the bank, but also to encourage banks to reduce lending further (Gorton, 1988) .
Previous literature regarding systemic risk measurement using high frequency time-series data, the use of credit default swaps (CDS Systemic risk studies using cross-sectional designed by Acharya et al. (2010) aims to introduce a systemic risk size measurements using a technique systemic expected shortfall (SES) and the marginal expected shortfall (MES). MES and SES calculation are based on the daily equity returns. These studies provide sufficient evidence on the high predictive power in forecasting SES, which is calculated through the MES and leverage. Acharya et al. (2010) defines the expected shortfall as a systemic tendency of financial institutions to be undercapitalized when the system overall capital shortfall.
Analysis using CoVaR as methodologies for measuring systemic risk introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) with a study entitled "CoVaR" in which the author defines the nature and features CoVaR and ΔCoVaR in estimating systemic risk. This size is based on the concept of value-at-risk (VaR), is expressed by VaR (α), which is the maximum loss in α% confidence interval. In addition, the study also estimates the extent of determining factors such as leverage, size, and maturity mismatch in predicting systemic risk contribution. Output forecasting results of samples tested proved to be valid. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) defines systemic risk has two important components, namely first systemic risk is built-up during the credit boom when environmentally low risk assumed and can be labeled as 'volatility paradox' and the second component of systemic risk to the spillover effect that intensifies initial adverse shocks in times of crisis. This study outlines the spillover effects of direct and indirect and is based on the correlation tail variations between financial institutions and the financial system.
The results achieved by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) This study used a sample of 9 largest banks by assets as assets on the banks controlled 59.48%, or more than half of total banking assets in Indonesia. Indicatorbased approach has been proposed as a means of indirectly measuring systemic risk using indicators that are believed to be associated with the systemic risk or systemic interests. Pais and Stork (2013) showed that large banks tend to have high levels of value-at-risk (VaR) is a little taller and found that banks with huge assets have significant systemic risk is higher. Analysis of Huang, et.al (2011) showed that the marginal contribution of each bank's systemic risk indicator is determined largely by the size of the bank. Systemic risk contribution of each bank to the banking system is defined as a marginal contribution to systemic risk of the banking system as a whole.
Ayomi and Hermanto (2013) In accordance with the problems posed in the research, the purpose of this study was to estimate the individual risk of each bank based on an analysis of value-atrisk (VaR), to estimate the contribution of each bank to the risk of systemic whole in 
METHOD

Data
The data used is the financial data on 9 banks are used as samples, the period of January 2005 to December 2014, as well as stock market data that is used in the variable state. Source of data used comes from Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Capital
Market Directory (ICMD), Indonesia Stock Exchange, Bloomberg, and Yahoo! Finance.
Measurement Method
Value-at-Risk
Value-at-risk (VaR), which is created and developed by JP Morgan risk metrics have been widely used as a tool for measuring risk in financial markets. The theory behind the VaR lies in estimating the maximum value is lost on the asset or liability is given for a specific time period within a certain confidence level. However, much of the literature is currently challenging VaR as a tool to measure risk. Wong and Fong (2010) stated VaR focused on assets in isolation, because of the real risk of the assets considered less attention, especially when other assets are distress conditions. In addition, Dowd and Blake (2006) emphasizes that the signal VaR is only a maximum loss when the tail did not happen, but it did not warn about the losses that may occur.
It shows that only rely on VaR is not the right method to measure systemic risk.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) defines VaR as a quantile θ conditional on assets or can be denoted as follows:
There is three basic methods in calculating the value-at-risk presented by Dowd and Blake (2006), namely: parametric methods; nonparametric methods (historical simulation); and Monte Carlo simulation method. Parametric methods supported by distribution assumptions. However, the distribution assumption leads to the risk of error specification, so that selective distribution should be very accurate which is rather difficult to achieve in the study (Dowd and Blake, 2006 
Estimation Method
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) proposed a way that is relatively easy to calculate and interpret statistical measures of systemic risk in real time. The first point is to determine the market value of the assets of a bank. Roengpitya and Rungcharoenkitkul (2011) defines the market value of assets is market capitalization multiplied by the leverage ratio. Market capitalization is the total number of securities issued by companies in the market. While the leverage ratio in this case is the ratio of bank assets to the bank's equity. The market value of assets (A) can be denoted as follows:
where A is the market value of assets, M is the market capitalization, and L is the leverage ratio (assets to equity). To measure the return of the assets of a bank i is used the following equation:
To measure the system asset returns denoted as follows: so that the equation (13) become equation (15): (15) and equation (14) becomes equation (16) 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Estimated value-at-risk (VaR) of each bank using the coefficient generated from quantile regression of 5% and median VaR represents the tail probability of maximum loss of 5% and median. The estimation results of Value-at-Risk (VaR) on average during the critical condition (0.05 quantile) during the observation period showed that Bank I has the highest VaR value, which amounted to 14.56%, while the lowest VaR at Bank C, amounting 8.32%. The value of VaR at Bank I amounted to 14.56%. This means that there is a 5% possibility that investors will lose more than 14.56% of the portfolio value if investors choose Bank I as part of the portfolio.
Interpretation from another point of view is the investor Bank I has a 95% chance that their losses will not exceed 14.56% of the portfolio. The value of VaR on Bank C of 8.32%. This means that there is a 5% possibility that investors will lose more than 8.32% of the value of the portfolio if investors choose Bank C as part of the portfolio. Interpretation from another point of view is the investor Bank C has a 95% chance that their losses will not exceed 8.32% of the portfolio. Signifikan Vol. 6 (2), October 2017 CoVaR measured using quantile regression coefficients obtained from Return on Assets System conditional on each return bank and economic factors (state variables). Estimation of Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) of each bank using the coefficient generated from quantile regression of 5% and 50% (median) represents
CoVaR at 5% and median.Estimates of conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR) of each bank using the coefficient generated from quantile regression of 5% and a median representing CoVaR the tail probability of maximum loss of 5% and median. give effect to the system that impact the system will suffer a loss of 7.27%.The value of the conditional VaR system, amounting to 5.08% when Bank I in a state of distress.
That is the state of distress in Bank I would give effect to the system that impact the system will suffer a loss of 5.08%. individual risk among other banks, which amounted to 14.56%, while the contribution of the greatest systemic risk to the banking system is in Bank H, which amounted to 8.59%. Bank with value-at-risk (VaR) is high does not automatically become a bank which contribute greatly to the systemic risk in the banking system. So that needs to be done on the calculation method in addition to the value-at-risk (VaR) to assess the magnitude of systemic risk, one of them using a conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR).
In estimating the contribution of banks against systemic risk is not enough to look at the total assets of the bank. In this study, Bank H is a bank with the largest risk contribution (8.59%) had total assets eighth largest in Indonesia. In a state of crisis in the banking system, regulators would not only save the banks with total assets of large, but also the bank has total assets of small for the size is not the main reference for the contribution of banks to systemic risk. The failure of the banks that have small assets would trigger a rush to the bank to other banks the same level so that it can add to the uncertainty on the domestic market, which is fatal for the economy. 
